Precedents Construing Statutes
Administered by Federal Agencies After
the Chevron Decision: What Gives?
Jahan Sharifit
The scope and power of administrative agencies has expanded
dramatically in the United States over the last forty years; not
only has government become significantly larger, "but the welfare
state [has] increasingly decid[ed] questions previously left to the
individual or otherwise unregulated." 1 The statutes administered
by these agencies have increased in number and the effects of federal regulation invade nearly every aspect of modern life. Because
of this expansion of the power of federal government, "[a]n important function of the modern judiciary is to ensure that decisions by
'2
administrative agencies remain within statutory boundaries.
However, it is not immediately evident how to allocate the responsibility for interpreting statutes administered by agencies.
Both the courts and administrative agencies can make powerful arguments that they should have the authority to interpret statutes
that govern the agencies. On the one hand, "[t]o determine 'what
the law is' in the context of an actual controversy that turns on a
question of statutory meaning is the quintessential judicial function."' The roots of this argument reach back to Marbury v
Madison4 and to Hamilton's statement in Federalist 78 that "[t]he
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of
the courts ....
It must therefore belong to them to ascertain...
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I Ernest Gellhorn, Opening Remarks: Administrative Law in Transition, 38 Admin L
Rev 107, 110 (1986).
2 Kenneth W. Starr, JudicialReview in the Post-ChevronEra, 3 Yale J Reg 283 (1986).
Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the AdministrativeState, 89 Colum L Rev 452 (1989). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administrationafter Chevron, 90 Colum L Rev 2071, 2085 (1990) ("Before the discretionary, policy-making administrative agency became pervasive, the notion that courts would interpret
the law, including federal statutes, seemed axiomatic.").
1 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.").
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the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative
body."'
On the other hand, administrative agencies might be better
prepared to interpret statutes that they work with every day.' The
agencies' technical expertise and familiarity with the history, purpose and current congressional views of their governing statutes
make them better able to judge what will best effectuate the pur1
poses of the legislation that they are charged with administering.
Perhaps the strongest argument for giving administrative agencies
the authority to interpret their governing statutes is that agencies,
unlike courts, are accountable to the electorate, albeit indirectly.'
For many years, the question of whether the courts should independently interpret statutes governing administrative agencies
or defer to the agencies' interpretations remained unsettled.9 Some

B Federalist 78 (Hamilton) in Max Beloff, ed, The Federalist 398 (Basil Blackwell, 2d
ed 1987).
' Farina, 89 Colum L Rev at 453 (cited in note 3); Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2086-87
(cited in note 3).
See, for example, Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L J 511, 514; Stephen G. Breyer, JudicialReview of Questions of
Law and Policy, 38 Admin L Rev 363, 368 (1986).
8 Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2087 (cited in note 3).
Judge Friendly wrote in 1976:
We think it is time to recognize ... that there are two lines of Supreme Court decisions
on this subject which are analytically in conflict, with the result that a court of appeals
must choose the one it deems more appropriate for the case at hand. Leading cases
support[ ] the view that great deference must be given to the decisions of an administrative agency applying a statute to the facts and that such decisions can be reversed
only if without rational basis .... However, there is an impressive body of law sanctioning free substitution of judicial for administrative judgment when the question involves the meaning of a statutory term.
Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v Dellaventura,544 F2d 35, 49 (2d Cir 1976) (citations omitted),
aff'd as Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v Caputo, 432 US 249 (1977). See Thomas W.
Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L J 969, 971-75 (1992);
Breyer, 38 Admin L Rev at 366-67 (cited in note 7).
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cases argued for great deference;1 0 other cases upheld a court's
power to interpret a statute as it saw fit."
In Chevron v Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 2 a
unanimous Supreme Court adopted a clear two-step approach for
deciding when to accept an agency's interpretation of a statute.
The first step requires that a court determine whether there is
clear congressional intent that governs the interpretation of the
statute. If Congress has spoken to the issue, the court must give
effect to Congress's intent. 13 The second step of Chevron requires
that a court defer to the agency's interpretation offered by an administrative agency if Congress has not "directly addressed the
precise question at issue."' 4 The clarity of the test signalled that
the Court might have settled the issue of how courts should ad10

FEC v Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 US 27, 39 (1981) ("[T]he

task for the Court of Appeals was not to interpret the statute as it thought best but rather
the narrower inquiry into whether the Commission's construction was 'sufficiently reasonable' to be accepted by a reviewing court."); Ford Motor Credit Co. v Milhollin, 444 US 555,
565 (1980) (Federal Reserve Board's interpretation of its governing statute controls unless it
is "demonstrably irrational"); Packard Motor Car Co. v NLRB, 330 US 485, 485 (1947)
(agreeing with a determination by the NLRB that foremen qualified as an appropriate bargaining unit under the National Labor Relations Act); Gray v Powell, 314 US 402, 412
(1941) (upheld an agency determination that a company's activities were subject to regulation by the Department of the Interior).
11Office Employees Int'l Union, Local No. 11 v NLRB, 353 US 313, 319 (1957) (rejecting NLRB's refusal to assert jurisdiction over labor unions as contrary to legislative
intent).
12 467 US 837 (1984).
13 Id at 842-43. The opinion read:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
Repeating accepted notions of the judiciary's role, the opinion also noted:
The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent ....If a
court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress
had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be
given effect.
Id at 843 n 9.
14 Id at 842-43.
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.
Later in the opinion, the Court stated that where Congress has left "gaps" for an
agency to fill by regulation, "[s]uch legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id at 843-44.
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dress agency interpretations of statutes they administer.1 5 The
Chevron decision was quickly recognized as one of the most important decisions in administrative law.'
Nevertheless, despite the apparent simplicity of the Chevron
test, courts have disagreed over how far Chevron's principle of deference extends and, in particular, how to reconcile it with the doctrine of stare decisis. 17 When a court confronts a new agency interpretation that conflicts with a prior judicial construction of a
statute, it must decide what use to make of that precedent. Before
Chevron, a prior judicial construction was binding upon lower
courts under the doctrine of stare decisis and upon later panels in
a circuit which had previously considered the question under a
practice known as "the law of the circuit."' 8 However, if a prior
construction represented that earlier court's deference to an
agency interpretation, how can that earlier construction continue
to bind courts after Chevron? Under the terms of Chevron, if clear
congressional intent does not demand a certain construction and if
an agency reasonably construes the statute, then a court must defer to the agency's new interpretation.
In examining this issue, it helps to consider the related issue
of whether administrative agency interpretations of statutes that
are new or depart from a past interpretation should be given the
15 Despite this seeming clarity, there is disagreement as to whether the Supreme Court

has given effect to the standard established in Chevron. In a recent article, Thomas Merrill
argues that "the Court does not regard Chevron as a universal test for determining when to
defer to executive interpretations: the Chevron framework is used in only about half the
cases that the Court perceives as presenting a deference question." Merrill, 101 Yale L J at
970 (cited in note 9). He notes that the "multiple factors" used by pre-Chevron courts to
determine whether or not to defer to an agency have not disappeared; "to the contrary, the
Court continues to rely upon them in many cases, despite their apparent irrelevance under
Chevron." Id.
16 See Ronald M. Levin, JudicialReview of Administrative Action in a Conservative
Era, 39 Admin L Rev 353, 356 (1987); Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 512 (cited in note 7); Starr, 3
Yale J Reg at 312 (cited in note 2). But consider the suggestion made by Judge Breyer, 38
Admin L Rev at 373 (cited in note 7). After describing the pre-Chevron context, which
permits varying levels of deference to agency interpretations, he discusses the "simpler approach" advocated in Chevron, and suggests that "[d]espite its attractive simplicity, however, this interpretation seems unlikely in the long run, to replace the complex approach
described above . . . ." Judge Breyer's prediction is bolstered by the analysis in Professor
Merrill's recent article. See note 15; Merrill, 101 Yale L J at 980-85, 1034-41 (cited in note

9).

See Merrill, 101 Yale L J at 989-90 (cited in note 9).
"I "A panel decision is binding on district courts within the circuit and on other panels
until overruled by the circuit en banc or by the Supreme Court." Rebecca Hanner White,
Time for a New Approach: Why the Judiciary Should Disregardthe "Law of the Circuit"
when Confronting Nonacquiescence by the National Labor Relations Board, 69 NC L Rev
639, 672-73 (1991).
17
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same deference as longstanding agency interpretations."9 Before
Chevron, courts often deferred to administrative agency interpretations that were longstanding, consistent, and contemporaneous
with the passage of the statute, but scrutinized new interpretations
more carefully.2 0 Although some Justices have supported this distinction between longstanding interpretations and new interpretations even after Chevron,"' "if Chevron is right, this position is
wrong .... "22 Administrative agencies are granted deference not
because they are better able to find the one, true meaning of a
statute, but because statutory ambiguities should be resolved by
specialized administrators who are accountable to the electorate.2 3
If accountability lies behind the authority of an agency to interpret
a statute, then an agency must be able to change its interpretation
in response to pressure from those to whom it is accountable.
Although this reasoning may suggest that courts should defer
even when an agency changes its longstanding interpretation of a
statute, it is not so clear that an agency should be permitted to
change its interpretation of a statute if an earlier interpretation
had been identified by a court, perhaps the Supreme Court, as the
9 See Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2101-04 (cited in note 3).
10 Id at 2101-02. See, for example, EEOC v Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 US 590,

600 n 17 (1981); Andrus v Shell Oil Co., 446 US 657, 667-68 (1980) (deferring to contemporaneous agency interpretation). But see, Davies Warehouse Co. v Bowles, 321 US 144, 156
(1944); PittstonStevedoring Corp. v Dellaventura,544 F2d 35, 49-50 (2d Cir 1976), aff'd as
Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v Caputo, 432 US 249 (1977) (ignoring contemporaneous agency interpretation).
Although Professor Sunstein states that the "reasons for this distinction never have
been entirely clear," he suggests that "[p]erhaps the special deference accorded to longstanding interpretations embodied an effort to import principles of stare decisis into administrative processes in order to protect reliance and expectations." Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev
at 2102 (cited in note 3).
2' See INS v Cardoza-Fonseca,480 US 421, 446 n 30 (1987), quoting Watt v Alaska,
451 US 259, 273 (1981) ("An additional reason for rejecting the INS's request for heightened
deference to its position is the inconsistency of the positions the BIA has taken through the
years. An agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency's
earlier interpretation is 'entitled to considerably less deference' than a consistently held
agency view."). But see Rust v Sullivan, 111 S Ct 1759, 1769 (1991), quoting Chevron, 467
US at 862 ("This Court has rejected the argument that an agency's interpretation 'is not
entitled to deference because it represents a sharp break with prior interpretations' of the
statute in question.").
" Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2102 (cited in note 3). See also Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at
517 (cited in note 7) ("(T]here is no longer any justification for giving 'special' deference to
'long-standing and consistent' agency interpretations of law. That venerable principle made
a lot of sense when we assumed that both court and agency were searching for the one,
permanent, 'correct' meaning of the statute; it makes no sense when we acknowledge that
the agency is free to give the statute whichever of several possible meanings it thinks most
conducive to accomplishment of the statutory purpose.").
21 Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2103 (cited in note 3).
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correct construction of the statute. Certainly, there would be
"something unsettling about a world in which executive branch administrators could 'overrule' Supreme Court decisions. '24 Therefore, it is essential that a coherent and consistent approach be developed to respond to this conflict between the doctrine of stare
decisis-which requires courts to follow prior constructions of statutes-and the mandate of Chevron-which gives agencies responsibility for interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions.
A court could follow one of three approaches when presented
with pre-Chevron precedent. The first approach would be to simply accept any prior construction of a statute as binding on lower
courts.25 Under the terms of Chevron, this approach appears
clearly unacceptable. 2' Earlier courts often deferred to an agency's
interpretation of a statute. To hold that an earlier deferential ruling constitutes binding precedent after Chevron and trumps an
agency's new interpretation ignores the strict standard established
by Chevron's first step: Only if there is clear congressional intent
on an issue may a court replace an agency's construction with its
own.
The second approach would grant an earlier holding precedential value based on what the earlier court believed it was doing. If
an earlier court adopted its interpretation because it represented
Congress's intent, then the prior interpretation would meet the
Chevron step one test and would be considered controlling precedent. If an earlier opinion identified the interpretation in question
as one which Congress had explicitly or implicitly delegated to the
agency, to which the earlier court deferred, then this would also be
considered controlling precedent, requiring the present court to accept the new agency interpretation (as long as it was "reasonable")
under Chevron step two.

24 Merrill, 101 Yale L J at 989 (cited in note 9). See also Mesa Verde Construction Co.
v Northern California Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F2d 1124, 1146-49 (9th Cir 1988)
(Kozinski dissenting).
25 When used in this Comment, the term lower courts also refers to other panels in a
circuit which has already ruled on the issue.
28 It has been argued that previous constructions made by the Supreme Court simply
take precedence over any deference owed to administrative agencies demanded by Chevron.
Professor Merrill argues that this "outcome does not follow from the logic of Chevron, and
must be counted as . . . [a] qualification on that doctrine." Merrill, 101 Yale L J at 990
(cited in note 9). Although Professor Merrill suggests that the Court simply ignores Chevron
in such situations, this Comment argues that the Court is using a more complicated approach. However, Professor Merrill's argument may best explain the Court's decision in
Lechmere, Inc. v NLRB, 112 S Ct 841 (1992). See Section I.D.
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This second approach suggests that if a court can determine
that an earlier court had based its construction on clear congressional intent, it must follow that earlier construction under stare
decisis. 27 Or if a court can determine that an earlier court implicitly held that Congress had not directly spoken to the precise issue
in question, it must bypass Chevron step one and accept the
agency's new interpretation under Chevron step two, as long as it
is a reasonable interpretation of the statute.2 8
Of course, the primary difficulty encountered in following the
approach outlined above lies in determining whether in fact an
earlier court based its interpretation on what it considered to be
clear congressional intent. That earlier court made its interpretation in a context which gave it final authority to determine a statute's meaning, whether or not Congress had spoken directly to the
issue.29 Because of the difficulty inherent in discerning the intentions of an earlier court, a court may instead want to make a presumption that pre-Chevron precedents are unreliable in the postChevron context.
This suggests a third approach, which is outlined in Section II
of this Comment. Under this approach, a court would consider
prior rulings only as informative-not as binding precedent-and
would examine each statute anew under the Chevron analysis.
Chevron demands a reformulation of the role of stare decisis, because it marked a fundamental reconception of how to interpret
public law.

I.

USING PRECEDENT FROM PRE-CHEVRON CASES

One possible approach to pre-Chevron precedent after Chevron would attempt to translate the pre-Chevron opinion into a
27 This is one reading of Maislin Industries v Primary Steel, Inc., 497 US 116 (1990).
See Section I.A.
28 This is the approach taken in Mesa Verde, 861 F2d 1124. See Section I.B. A court
might believe that an earlier court's interpretation had been based on deference to an
agency rather than clear congressional intent, but that, in fact, Congress had directly addressed the precise issue in question. In that case, the court might want to introduce its
reading of congressional intent as a Chevron step one interpretation. This, however, is not a
viable interpretative stance. It is hardly an acceptable presumption that the earlier court
had either mistakenly ignored or deliberately rejected clear congressional intent in interpreting a statute and had instead deferred to an administrative agency's interpretation (or
substituted its own interpretation).
" See, for example, FTC v Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 US 374, 385 (1965) ("[W]hile
informed judicial determination is dependent upon enlightenment gained from administrative experience," words setting forth "a legal standard . . .must get their final meaning
from judicial construction.").
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post-Chevron analysis. This approach is suggested by one reading
of the Supreme Court's decision in Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v
Primary Steel, Inc..30 In Maislin, the Court held: "Once we have
determined a statute's clear meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency's
later interpretation of the statute against our prior determination
of the statute's meaning."' 31 The Court stated that earlier interpretations of the statutory provision in question had been based on
the statute's clear meaning and gave effect to Congress's central
purpose in passing the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA). 32 For these
reasons, the Court held the new agency interpretation invalid because it conflicted with the prior construction of the statute, which
constituted binding precedent. 33 Therefore, one way of reading
Maislin is that, in Chevron terms, the Court found that earlier decisions had implicitly held that the precise question at issue could
be decided at Chevron step one, because Congress's intent was
clear.
A. Reading Maislin
In Maislin, the Court addressed a new policy implemented by
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 34 and upheld in five
circuits.3 5 This policy overturned a longstanding practice of the
ICC that required a shipper to pay the shipping rate that its carrier had filed with the ICC even when it had privately negotiated a
lower rate.
In this case, petitioner Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc., a bankrupt carrier, sought to recover undercharges from a shipper, respondent Primary Steel. Maislin's subsidiary Quinn Freight Lines
had negotiated rates with Primary lower than Quinn's rates on file
with the ICC. Relying on its decision in Negotiated Rates 1,36 the
3o497

US 116 (1990).

-1 Id at 131.
"3 Id at 130-31.
33 Id.
31 See NITL-Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common Carrier
Rates, 3 ICC2d 99 (1986) (NegotiatedRates 1); NITL-Petition to InstituteRulemaking on
Negotiated Motor Common CarrierRates, 5 ICC2d 623 (1989) (Negotiated Rates I1).
'5 See Delta Traffic Service, Inc. v Transtop, Inc., 902 F2d 101 (1st Cir 1990); Delta
Traffic Service, Inc. v Appco Paper& Plastics Corp., 893 F2d 472 (2d Cir 1990); Orscheln
Bros. Truck Lines, Inc. v Zenith Electric Corp., 899 F2d 642 (7th Cir 1990); Maislin v
Primary Steel, Inc., 879 F2d 400 (8th Cir 1989); West Coast Truck Lines, Inc. v Weyerhaeuser Co., 893 F2d 1016 (9th Cir 1990). The last four of these cases have been either
vacated, reversed or withdrawn.
33 ICC2d 99 (1986).
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ICC determined that collection of the filed rate by Maislin would
constitute an unreasonable practice under ICA § 10701,3 7 and that
"a finding that the carrier engaged in an unreasonable practice

should, like a finding that the filed rate is unreasonable, disentitle
the carrier to collection of the filed rate. ' 8 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the approach taken by the ICC, 9 concluding that because
§ 10701 did not specifically address what practices were to be considered unreasonable and because the ICC's interpretation of
§ 10701 was rational and consistent with the ICA, its new interpretation should receive deference under Chevron."
The Supreme Court disagreed. It first pointed to a "century"
of consistent interpretation of the ICA forbidding the "secret negotiation and collection of rates lower than the filed rate.

'41

The

Court pointed out that Congress had not diverged from that interpretation, despite the extended opportunity to change the interpretation through legislation, implicitly suggesting that such a refusal indicated congressional approval of the interpretation.42 The
Court concluded that the ICC's new interpretation was "flatly inconsistent with the statutory scheme as a whole. ' 43 Noting that it
had previously "determined [the] statute's clear meaning," the
court chose to "adhere to that determination under the doctrine of
stare decisis ..

.

In support of its position the Court drew on precedent reaching from 198645 back to 1895.46 These cases manifested an unwa-

vering interpretation of the ICA as prohibiting the collection of
rates lower than the filed rate. Known as the "filed rate doctrine,"
this interpretation was stated most succinctly in Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Co. v Maxwell:
Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the rate of the carrier
duly filed is the only lawful charge. Deviation from it is not
permitted upon any pretext. Shippers and travelers are
charged with notice of it, and they as well as the carrier must
37 "A... practice related to transportation or service provided by a carrier ...
reasonable." 49 USC § 10701(a) (1982).
"' Maislin, 497 US at 129.
3' Maislin, 879 F2d at 405.
40

Id at 406.

41

Maislin, 497 US at 130.

42

Id at 135.
Id at 131.

43

must be

" Id.
45 Square D Co. v Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 US 409, 415-17 (1986).
46 Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v Hefley, 158 US 98, 101 (1895).
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abide by it, unless it is found by the Commission to be unreasonable. Ignorance or misquotation of rates is not an excuse
for paying or charging either less or more than the rate filed.
This rule is undeniably strict and it obviously may work hardship in some cases, but it embodies the policy which has been
adopted by Congress in the regulation of interstate commerce
in order to prevent unjust discrimination. 7
The Court assembled a wide range of cases that supported the
filed rate doctrine. 48 The language of these cases implied that def-

erence to the ICC was not central to the Court's maintenance of
the filed rate doctrine. Rather, there is repeated emphasis on Congress's clear intent that the ICA was to prevent discriminatory
pricing, and there is an absence of any language of deference. An
example of the emphasis on congressional intent can be found in
Keogh v Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co.: "This stringent rule
prevails, because otherwise the paramount purpose of Congress-prevention of unjust discrimination-might be defeated. ' 49
The Maislin majority recognized that decisions of the ICC deserved deference, but not when its interpretation of a statute contradicted the statute's clear meaning: "Although the Commission
has both the authority and expertise generally to adopt new policies when faced with new developments in the industry.., it does
not have the power to adopt a policy that directly conflicts with its
governing statute." 50 The Maislin majority argued that Congress
had designed the statute in such a way as to require the filed rate
doctrine, and that "'[a]ny other construction of the statute opens
the door to the possibility of the very abuses of unequal rates
which it was the design of the statute to prohibit and punish.' "51

47 237 US 94, 97 (1915) (quoted in Maislin, 497 US at 127).
48 Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v Commercial Metals Co., 456 US 336, 352 (1982);
Baldwin v Scott County Milling Co., 307 US 478, 484-85 (1939); Louisville & Nashville Ry.
Co. v CentralIron & Coal Co., 265 US 59, 65 (1924); Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v Carl,
227 US 639, 653 (1913); Armour Packing Co. v United States, 209 US 56, 81 (1908); Texas
& Pacific Ry. Co. v Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 US 426, 439 (1907); Texas & Pacific Ry. Co.
v Mugg, 202 US 242, 245 (1906).
"' Maislin, 497 US at 126, quoting Keogh, 260 US 156, 163 (1922). See also Southern
Pacific, 456 US at 344 ("This rule of strict adherence to statutory standards is in line with
the historic purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act-to achieve uniformity in freight transportation charges, and thereby to eliminate the discrimination and favoritism that had
plagued the railroad industry in the late 19th century.").
60 Maislin, 497 US at 134-35 (citations omitted).
61 Id at 130-31, quoting Armour Packing, 209 US at 81 (emphasis added).
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Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the majority had ignored the demands of Chevron.5 2 He claimed that the majority
"fail[ed] to adhere.., to the teaching of Chevron" in dismissing it
"by means of a conclusory assertion" despite the fact that the circuit courts had depended on Chevron in the cases below.53 In response to the plethora of supporting cases cited by the majority,
Justice Stevens stated:
The fact that the Court has strictly enforced the filed rate
doctrine in the many cases in which it served the agency's regulatory purposes provides no justification for enforcing the
doctrine in a competitive market in which it frustrates the
agency's attempt to carry out the plainly expressed intent of
Congress."
Justice Stevens further argued that neither the language of the
statute"5 nor the regulatory scheme established by the ICA 56 and
modified by the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 justified the interpretation placed on the statute by the majority. Justice Stevens concluded that the ICC's determination that it would be an unreasonable practice for Maislin to recover the difference between the
negotiated rates and the tariff rates from its customer "was unquestionably consistent with the plain language of the statute governing the Commission's authority. ' 57 Justice Stevens's regulatory
argument was based on Congress's new intent to promote competition, which made the filed rate doctrine an "anachronism" in the
58
motor carrier industry.
Justice Scalia rushed to the defense of the majority and the
Chevron principle in his concurrence.5" He argued against Justice
Stevens's interpretation of the statute and concluded that the text
fully supported the filed rate doctrine.6 0 He suggested, moreover,
that the majority was making a Chevron step one decision. Justice

Maislin, 497 US at 152 (Stevens dissenting).
53Id.
52

"Id.

55Id

at 139-44.
56Id at 144-51.
57

Id at 141.

53Id at 147. See generally, Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub L No 96-296, 94 Stat 793,
codified at 49 USC § 10101 (1982).
Maislin, 497 US at 136-38 (Scalia concurring).
" Id at 136. Justice Scalia pointed out that "[w]hatever
else may qualify as an unreasonable practice, under no sensible construction of that term could it consist of failing to do
what the statute explicitly prohibits doing-viz., charging or receiving a rate different from
the rate specified in a tariff."
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Scalia's concurring opinion, with its specific response to Justice
Stevens's reading of the text of the statute, provided an example of
how the majority opinion might have been better written. 1 If, as it
asserts, the majority believed that the Court had previously "determined [the] statute's clear meaning,""2 then why did the majority concentrate only on providing myriad pre-Chevron precedents,
rather than showing the clarity of the statute?"
Although Justice Scalia argued that the Maislin majority
based its decision on the text of the ICA and not on the authority
of pre-Chevron interpretations, Maislin can be read as an argument that pre-Chevron authority can have precedential weight after Chevron. Nevertheless, Maislin still would not answer conclusively the question of whether all, or only some, pre-Chevron
decisions are binding precedent.
The Maislin majority stated that if a statute's "clear meaning" had been determined, it would adhere to that interpretation, 4
but it is not a simple matter to discover whether a prior court actually determined a statute's clear meaning or whether it deferred
to the interpretation suggested by the agency. Mesa Verde Construction Co. v Northern California District Council of Laborers
clearly illustrates this difficulty. 5 The Ninth Circuit considered
whether it should defer to a new interpretation of a statute by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Although the Supreme
Court had upheld the NLRB's previous interpretation of the statute in two cases,66 the Ninth Circuit ruled that those cases had
merely been an expression of deference to the NLRB's previous
interpretation. 7 Relying on Chevron, the court ruled in favor of
the NLRB's new interpretation, and, in the face of spirited dissents, held that the Supreme Court's earlier reading of the statute
did not rise to the level set by Chevron step one.6 8

"' See Section II.
62Maislin, 497 US at 131.
63 See Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2103-104 n 149 (criticizing majority for ignoring
Chevron principles) (cited in note 3).
Maislin, 497 US at 131.
65

861 F2d 1124 (9th Cir 1988) (en banc).

6 Jim McNeff, Inc. v Todd, 461 US 260 (1983); NLRB v Local Union No. 103, Int'l
Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO, 434 US 335 (1978)
(Higdon).
" Mesa Verde, 861 F2d at 1130.
" Id.
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Reading Mesa Verde

Section 8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)6 9
permitted pre-hire agreements between construction unions and
employers. These pre-hire agreements allowed contractors to arrange for a guaranteed work force before a particular construction
job began.70 The NLRB had changed its earlier position that such
pre-hire agreements could be unilaterally repudiated7 1 and decided
that they could not be unilaterally repudiated prior to an NLRBconducted election in which the employees voted to reject or
change their bargaining representative.7 2
In upholding the NLRB's new interpretation, the Mesa Verde
court made a strong argument that the two prior Supreme Court
decisions upholding the NLRB's earlier interpretation of
§ 8(f)--Jim McNeff, Inc. v Todd7" and NLRB v Local Union No.
103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers,
AFL-CIO (Higdon)74 -were merely expressions of deference to the
NLRB. 75 The Mesa Verde majority argued that the Supreme
Court did not "definitively construe 8(f)" in either case. 76 Instead,
the majority continued, "the Court found that the Board's interpretation of 8(f) was an acceptable interpretation of the statute
and that it reasonably implemented the purposes of the Act. The
Court, therefore, deferred to the NLRB's interpretation of 8(f). ' 7
The majority pointed to language in Higdon, which, in its
opinion, gave a strong indication of deference by the Supreme
Court. The majority quoted the Higdon Court's conclusion that
the NLRB's construction of the NLRA "although perhaps not the
only tenable one, is an acceptable reading of the statutory language
49

29 USC § 158(f) (1982).

7o Mesa Verde, 861 F2d at 1127.
71 R.J. Smith Construction Co., 191 NLRB Dec (CCH) 693 (1971), enforcement denied
as Local 150, Int'l Union of OperatingEng'rs, AFL-CIO v NLRB, 480 F2d 1186 (D C Cir
1973); Ruttmann Construction Co., 191 NLRB Dec (CCH) 701 (1971).
7' Deklewa, 282 NLRB Dec (CCH) 1375, 1385 (1987), enforced as Int'l Ass'n of Bridge,
Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 3 v NLRB, 843 F2d 770 (3d Cir 1988).
73 461 US 260 (1983).
74 434 US 335 (1978).
71 In Higdon, the Supreme Court upheld a ruling by the NLRB that an uncertified
union with a § 8(f) agreement with an employer committed an unfair labor practice when it
picketed the employer to force it to abide by the pre-hire agreement, since a § 8(f) agreement is voidable until the union attains majority support. 434 US at 341, 346. In McNeff,
the Court held that despite the fact that a § 8(f) agreements may be repudiated at will,
monetary obligations incurred by an employer to an uncertified union prior to repudiation
survived. 461 US at 271-72.
7, 861 F2d at 1129.
77 Id.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[60:223

and a reasonable implementation of the purposes of the relevant
statutory sections. '7' The Mesa Verde majority noted that the
Higdon Court "recognized the expertise and experience of the
[NLRB] in effectuating national labor policy as mandated by Congress and limited its review to whether the Board's interpretation
of 8(f) was reasonable. '7 9 The majority likewise considered McNeff
not to represent an independent construction of § 8(f), because
McNef had merely relied on Higdon in ruling that § 8(f) agreements were voidable.8 0
Relying on deferential language in the two decisions and noting similar reasoning by the Third Circuit in Deklewa v Int'l Ass'n
of Bridge, Structural and OrnamentalIronworkers, Local 3,81 the
Mesa Verde majority concluded that "neither Higdon nor McNeff
preclude this court from adopting the view of the NLRB as expressed in Deklewa. Neither constitutes an independent construction of the statute."8 2 The court then accepted the NLRB's new
interpretation because it appeared "consistent with the legislative
history of section 8(f), as well as the dominant principles of employee free choice and labor relations stability." ' Higdon and
McNeff, however, contain language that could support an argument that the Supreme Court was definitively construing § 8(f). In
Judge Hug's dissenting view, Higdon deferred to the NLRB only in
the sense that it gave "heightened consideration to the Board's arguments," and ultimately "passed judgment upon the meaning of
section 8(f)" which is "binding under . . . stare decisis. ' 8 4 Since
Judge Hug found Higdon and McNeff to be based on' clear con78 Id, quoting Higdon, 434 US at 341.

79 Mesa Verde, 861 F2d at 1129.
80 Id at 1129, citing McNefl, 461 US at 266-67.
81 Mesa Verde, 861 F2d at 1130 n 4.
82 861 F2d at 1130. See also Deklewa, 843 F2d at 776:
In neither case has the Supreme Court adopted the Board's R.J. Smith interpretation
of § 8(f) as definitive and binding. Indeed in Higdon.... the Supreme Court... made
clear that it was merely reviewing the Board's interpretation of § 8(f) and not substituting its own judgement or prescribing its own interpretation of the statute ....
While McNeff is not as explicit as Higdon in making it clear that the Supreme
Court was merely reviewing the Board's interpretation and not establishing one of its
own, nowhere in the McNef/ opinion does the Court hold that the statute requires
§ 8(f) agreements to be voidable. Furthermore, McNeff relies very heavily upon Higdon which did make it clear that the Court was doing no more than holding that the
Board's reading 'of the act was reasonable.
8 Mesa Verde, 861 F2d at 1134.
84 Id at 1138 (Hug dissenting). The strongest language from Higdon that Hug cited
states:
Congressionalconcern about coerced designations of bargaining agents did not evaporate as the focus turned to the construction industry.
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gressional intent and straightforward statutory interpretation,85 he
read the Supreme Court's holdings in those cases as binding
precedent.8
The Mesa Verde majority based its holding on the proposition
that if language indicating deference is present in a pre-Chevron
opinion, a court must find that the earlier court had found no congressional intent on the precise question at issue. The Mesa Verde
majority found that McNeff and Higdon had implicitly held that
this question required a Chevron step two analysis, because Congress had not addressed the precise question of whether or not prehire agreements could be unilaterally repudiated. Consequently,
this issue called for deference to a reasonable NLRB
interpretation.
C.

One Possible Approach

Considering the reading of Maislin outlined earlier 87 together
with Mesa Verde suggests one approach to pre-Chevron authority:
a court should read an earlier opinion for direction as to whether a
prior judicial interpretation of an agency-administered statute
should be regarded as precedent after Chevron. A court would read
an earlier opinion for two central elements: 1) presence of language

(n. 10) Congress was careful to make its intention clear that prehire agreements
were to be arrived at voluntarily, and no element of coercion was to be admitted into
the narrow exception being established to the majority principle.
Id at 1142 n 2 (Hug dissenting), quoting Higdon, 434 US at 347-48 n 10 and accompanying
text (emphasis added by Hug).
Judge Hug found further support for his position in McNeff. There, the strongest language reads:
In upholding the Board's view that a union commits an unfair labor practice by picketing to enforce a prehire agreement before it has majority status, we noted in Higdon
that this view protects two interests that Congress intended to uphold when it enacted

§ 8(f).
[O]ur decision in Higdon promotes Congress' "intention ...that prehire agreements
were to be arrived at voluntarily... ." In accord with this intention, we approved the
Board's conclusion that a "prehire agreement is voidable" "until and unless [the union]
attains majority support in the relevant unit."
Mesa Verde, 861 F2d at 1143, quoting McNeff, 461 US at 267-69 (citations omitted) (em-

phasis added by Hug).
Judge Hug quoted further from McNeff, emphasizing language that points to congressional intent and that refers to prehire agreements "as being voluntary and voidable with
the undoubted right of a party to repudiate the agreement prior to the union achieving
majority status." Mesa Verde, 861 F2d at 1143-44 (Hug dissenting).
85 Mesa Verde, 861 F2d at 1144.
'6 Id.
s See Section I.A.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[60:223

suggesting that the court believed it was effectuating congressional
intent, and 2) absence of language that indicates deference to the
relevant agency.
One of these elements would not suffice; language in McNeff
hinting that the Court had looked to Congress's intent in finding
§ 8(f) agreements voidable did not persuade the Mesa Verde majority. 8 Only when there is clear language stating that Congress
had spoken to the issue, combined with an absence of language
suggesting deference to the agency or suggesting that the court
considered alternative solutions, would a pre-Chevron decision be
able to survive the scrutiny required by Chevron.
Taking Maislin and Mesa Verde together suggests that there
should be a strong presumption that pre-Chevron precedent does
not govern unless the prior interpretation's reliance on congressional intent has been clearly expressed. The Ninth Circuit interpreted Maislin very narrowly in a later case:
Maislin established an exception to the usual deference accorded an agency only where the agency's interpretation of
statutory language conflicts with well established Supreme
Court precedents ....
The ICC ruling here at issue is not
"flatly inconsistent with the statutory scheme as a whole" as
it was in Maislin.8 9
This understanding of Maislin places the presumption on the side
of deference to the agency. This approach, while workable, has
drawbacks. A court can read prior opinions however it wants. If a
court prefers the prior construction of a statute, it can search an
earlier opinion for language suggesting that the earlier court was
interpreting the statute based on congressional intent. If a court
prefers an agency's new interpretation, it can search the prior
opinion for signs of deference.
The same indeterminacy may obtain in the interpretation of
statutes themselves. Obviously, a court, whenever faced with a new
agency interpretation that it does not like, could claim to find clear
congressional intent requiring a different interpretation of the statute and so prevent the agency's interpretation from receiving deference under Chevron step two. In doing so, it would be construing
a statute in the way it thinks "best" despite the clear demands of
the Chevron decision. But language contained within an opinion
may be more malleable than typical statutory language. As is evi-

Mesa Verde, 861 F2d at 1142-44 (Hug dissenting).
89 Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v ICC, 921 F2d 904, 907 (9th Cir 1990).
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dent from the disagreement between Judge Hug's dissent in Mesa
Verde and the Mesa Verde majority, there is ample opportunity to
make a prior opinion say what one wants.9 0 Furthermore, a discussion of whether an opinion reveals clear congressional intent is one
step removed from the actual question asked by Chevron: Does the
statute reveal clear congressional intent? It is more straightforward to determine whether Congress had spoken directly to the
issue than to decide whether an earlier court had found that Congress had spoken directly to the issue, especially when that court's
opinion was written at a time when courts did not focus their reasoning on that particular question. Although prior opinions might
be granted some precedential value even after the context has been
changed by Chevron, disputing a prior opinion's view on a question, rather than disputing the question itself, engenders a lack of
respect for the law, thereby frustrating one of the central aims of
stare decisisY1
D.

A Refinement of Mesa Verde: Lechmere, Inc. v NLRB

Maislin can be read as permitting lower courts to ignore preChevron interpretations of statutory provisions that were not
based on clear congressional intent. If Maislin is read that way,
lower courts may evaluate pre-Chevron authority under the approach used by the Mesa Verde majority and overturn pre-Chevron interpretations based on deference to an administrative
agency. 2
A possible refinement to this approach was suggested last term
in Lechmere, Inc. v NLRB." In Lechmere, the Court struck down
a new NLRB interpretation of § 7 of the NLRA, 94 which had initially been expressed in the NLRB's opinion in Jean Country.95
The Court held that this new interpretation was inconsistent with

90 See text accompanying notes 65-86.
' White, 69 *NCL Rev at 671 (cited in note 18).
"

,

See Sections I.A-I.C.
112 S Ct 841 (1992).

29 USC § 157 (1982) ("Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations ....
).
11 291 NLRB Dec (CCH) 11 (1988). Jean Country addressed the rights of nonemployee
union agents to enter an employer's property in order to organize employees and established
a three factor balancing test which takes into account "[1] the degree of impairment of the
Section 7 right if access should be denied ... [2] the degree of impairment of the private
property right if access should be granted ....
[3] the availability of reasonably effective
alternative means .... " Id at 14.
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its 96
interpretation of § 7 as stated in NLRB v Babcock & Wilcox
Co.
In Babcock, the Court had overturned the NLRB's determination that nonemployee union organizers should have the right to
distribute union information on the employer's premises.9 7 The
NLRB believed such a right was necessary to give effect to the employees' § 7 right to self-organization.98 The Babcock Court stated
that nonemployee organizers should only be allowed to approach
employees on an employer's property "if the location of a plant
and the living quarters of the employees place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with
them . . .,,9
Although the Lechmere majority conceded that "the NLRB is
entitled to judicial deference when it interprets an ambiguous provision of a statute that it administers,"1 00 and cited Chevron, it
seemed to advocate the position that prior interpretations of a
statute by the Court would trump any new NLRB interpretation:
"Before we reach any issue of deference to the Board, however, we
must first determine whether Jean Country ... is consistent with
our past interpretation of § 7.''101 The Court then cited to Maislin:
"Once we have determined a statute's clear meaning, we adhere to
that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we
judge an agency's later interpretation of the statute against our
M
prior determination of the statute's meaning. 02
The majority also stated that it believed that the Babcock
Court, "[b]y reversing the Board's interpretation of the statute for
failing to distinguish between the organizing activities of employees and nonemployees, [was] saying, in Chevron terms, that § 7
speaks to the issue of nonemployee access to an employer's property."' 0 3 However, the Lechmere majority did not discuss how the
earlier interpretation in Babcock was based on clear congressional
intent. In fact, Babcock contained no language indicating that the
Court believed that it was giving effect to Congress's intent. The
Court in Babcock, after "recogniz[ing] ...that the Board has the
responsibility of 'applying the Act's general prohibitory language

96 351 US 105 (1956).
97 Id at 112-14.
98 Id at 110.
" Id at 113.
100 112 S Ct at 847.
101 Id.
'02Id at 847-48, quoting Maislin, 497 US at 130-31.
10I Lechmere, 112 S Ct at 848.
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in the light of the infinite combinations of events which might be
charged as violative of its terms,' "104 and stating its reluctance "to
overturn an administrative decision," 10 5 simply overturned the
NLRB decision at issue on its own judgment,10 8 reflecting an earlier conception of the Court's authority and responsibility for final
statutory interpretation. 0 7 The majority in Lechmere held that
stare decisis can overcome the demands of Chevron, as long as the
prior holding was based on the statute's "clear meaning," but, unlike the majority in Maislin, it did not make any effort to show
how the earlier interpretation of § 7 in Babcock was based on the
statutory provision's "clear meaning" or Congress's intent.
Justice White's dissent took the majority to task for this remarkable reading of Chevron, arguing that "Babcock is at odds
with modern concepts of deference to an administrative agency
charged with administering a statute .... Babcock did not ask if
Congress had specifically spoken to the issue of access of third parties .... "1 0 8 Justice White then noted that if Babcock had come up
for decision in the post-Chevron era, the Court would have deferred to the NLRB, and even if the NLRB had made one interpretation and then changed to another, the Court would have accepted that change.' Justice White concluded:
The more basic legal error of the majority today, like that of
the Court of Appeals in Chevron, is to adopt a static judicial
construction of the statute when Congress has not commanded that construction.... By leaving open the question of
how § 7 and private property rights were to be accommodated
under the NLRA, Congress delegated authority over that issue to the Board, and a court should not substitute its own
judgment for a reasonable construction by the Board. 110
If Lechmere indicates that the Court intends to modify the
standard established by Maislin, then Chevron will be weakened
considerably. Although the same term is used by both Maislin and
Lechmere-"clear meaning"-the Maislin majority made a strong
case that its interpretation of the ICA was based on Congress's intent in passing the statute. Lechmere made no argument that Con-

104

Babcock, 351 US at 111-12 (citation omitted).

105 Id at 112.

106Id.

107 See text accompanying notes 3-11.
108 Lechmere, 112 S Ct at 852 (White dissenting).
109Id at 853.
110Id.
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gress had intended such an interpetation of § 7 of the NLRA. If a
court can follow pre-Chevron precedent by making the barest of
arguments that the statute's clear meaning had been determined
by the earlier court, a court has wide latitude to do as it wishes
with new agency interpretations. Having this level of indeterminacy strikes against the primary value of the doctrine of stare decisis-certainty of the law-and strikes against the primary goal of
Chevron-delegation of the responsibility for interpreting the statutes they administer to administrative agencies.
Such a reading of Maislin would seem to be a powerful argument against this approach to pre-Chevron authority. However, it
is not clear that Lechmere was intended to change the requirements of Maislin, as the Lechmere majority rested its holding on
Maislin without further discussion. Perhaps Lechmere only indicated an anomalous reading of Maislin, not a permanent change in
the thinking of the Court on pre-Chevron precedents, and as such
should not be considered a redefinition of the Maislin approach.1 11
But another possibility should be considered: Lechmere may,
in fact, indicate the Court's final position on the interaction of preChevron authority with the demands of Chevron. Thomas Merrill
has suggested that the Court has gradually moved away from the
original requirement of Chevron's first step-that unless "Congress
[had] directly spoken to the precise question at issue"1'12 a court
should defer to a reasonable agency interpretation-and moved to
progressively less strict standards-such as whether a statute has a
"plain meaning."1 13 Professor Merrill argues that "[t]he [Court's]
movement from 'specific intention' to 'plain meaning' to 'plain
meaning considering the design of the statute as a whole' is but
one short step away from 'best meaning." "'14
211 This is how the D.C. Circuit treated Lechmere in a recent case. In US Postal Service v NLRB, 969 F2d 1064 (DC Cir 1992), the court rejected the argument made by the
Postal Service, based on Lechmere, that a reviewing court must first determine whether an
NLRB interpretation of a statute is consistent with Supreme Court precedent before it can
defer to an NLRB interpretation. The court stated that all the Supreme Court had done in
Lechmere was read "Babcock as saying, in Chevron terms, that Congress had directly spoken to the question at issue." Id at 1070. Whether or not the Lechmere majority was actually concerned with whether Congress had spoken to the precise question at issue in Lechmere is debatable, but the D.C. Circuit appeared willing to accept that it was in order to
preserve the Chevron test when considering new agency interpretations that conflict with
pre-Chevron authority.
112 Chevron, 467 US at 842.
"' Merrill, 101 Yale L J at 990 (cited in note 9).
114 Id at 991. Professor Merrill points out that Justice Scalia has expressly discussed
the consequences of moving from a concentration on Congress's intent to a concentration on
the "plain meaning" of the text of a statute: "One who finds more often (as I do) that the
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If the Court has chosen to shift its requirement for Chevron
step one from specific congressional intent to the plain language of
a statute, then Lechmere makes perfect sense. Any time the Court
finds that an earlier interpretation of a statute was based on the
statute's so-called clear meaning, then that interpretation would

meet the requirements of Chevron's first step and would be binding precedent.

Such a rule, although perhaps not problematic for the Supreme Court (it, after all, would be the final authority on whether
the earlier construction was based on clear meaning), poses serious
problems for lower courts. It is not a simple task to determine
whether an earlier court based its construction of a statute on clear
congressional intent. It is a far more difficult task to determine
conclusively whether language in an earlier Supreme Court opinion
indicates that the Court relied on the "clear meaning" of a statute. 115 Lechmere gives lower courts no guidance as to how they
should go about determining whether an earlier Supreme Court
construction rested on the plain language of a statute. Lower
courts might try to duck the issue by upholding all Supreme Court
precedents which conflict with new agency interpretations, but this
solution would appear to violate grossly the Chevron mandate."1 6 If
Lechmere does signal a redefinition of Maislin, the need for an alternate approach for lower courts is apparent as a practical
matter."

meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws,
thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists." Id,
quoting Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 521 (cited in note 7). Professor Merrill concludes that
Justice Scalia's approach "would dramatically transform Chevron from a deference doctrine
to a doctrine of antideference." Merrill, 101 Yale L J at 992 (cited in note 9).
15 Consider Justice White's point in Lechmere concerning the statute at issue: If the
Babcock Court, and the Lechmere majority, had inquired into how the NLRA § 7 dealt with
the access rights of non-employee union organizers, "the only basis for finding statutory
language that settled the issue would have been the language of § 7, which speaks only of
the rights of employees; i.e., the Court might have found that § 7 extends no access rights at
all to union representatives." Lechmere, 112 S Ct at 852 (White dissenting). More simply,
how did the majority in Lechmere find a "clear language" argument in a statute that made
no mention of the rights in question?
"I See text accompanying note 26.
11 The question of whether all pre-Chevron authority should be considered binding
precedent is an extremely serious political issue due to the change of administration. As
administrative agencies switch from Republican to Democratic control, there will likely be
an attempt made to reverse many interpretations made by agencies during the Reagan-Bush
era. If the Lechmere approach remains the defining approach of a judiciary now dominated
by Reagan-Bush appointees, many agency interpretations made during the early years of
the Reagan Revolution that were upheld by the Supreme Court and the circuit courts at the
time could be considered binding precedent. If, however, interpretations which are not
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UNDERSTANDING PRE- CHEVRON AUTHORITY
IN A NEW INTERPRETATIVE CONTEXT

Justice Scalia's reading of Maislin conflicts with the reading
proposed by the Lechmere majority. Scalia's Maislin concurrence
answered Justice Stevens's dissent, which excoriated the Maislin
majority for sacrificing the Chevron principle while mistakenly relying on pre-Chevron authority.11 8 Justice Scalia argued that the
majority had correctly relied on earlier decisions upholding the
filed rate doctrine " because those decisions had been based on the
text of the Interstate Commerce Act.120 Justice Scalia seemed to
argue that Maislin was rightly decided not because it upheld preChevron precedent, but because the Maislin majority (like the
Courts in the precedents which it cited) had correctly read the ICA
as requiring the maintenance of the filed rate doctrine.
Justice Scalia's reading of the majority opinion in Maislin is
supported by the majority's statement that the ICC's interpretation of the statutory provision in question was "contrary to the
language and structure of the statute as a whole . .

,.2.
The

Court further argued that "[b]y refusing to order collection of the
filed rate solely because the parties had agreed to a lower rate, the
ICC has permitted the very price discrimination that the Act by its
terms seeks to prevent.1

22

Although the majority quoted pre-

Chevron opinions to support its argument, the Maislin majority
can also be seen as making a new Chevron step one decision that
the ICC's interpretation of the statutory provision in question was
in conflict with clear congressional intent behind the ICA. This
reading of Maislin says that a court should refuse to defer to a new
agency interpretation only when a particular interpretation of a
statute is clearly demanded under Chevron step one. The key inquiry then is not what an earlier court thought it was doing in interpreting a statute, but whether in fact that earlier interpretation
is demanded by clear congressional intent. If so, that earlier interpretation is considered binding precedent, but only because it
meets the Chevron step one test. If not, a new, reasonable agency
interpretation should be accorded deference by the reviewing
clearly based on congressional intent are not considered binding precedent, it will be much
easier for Clinton appointees to change the direction of administrative agencies.
11

Maislin, 497 US at 151-53 (Stevens dissenting).
Id at 136 (Scalia concurring).

120

121
122

Id at 136-38.
Id at 130.
Id (emphasis added).
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court. In other words, a court, when confronted with a new agency
interpretation that conflicts with pre-Chevron authority, must simply apply the Chevron test to the new interpretation.
This approach makes sense because Chevron dramatically
changed the understanding of deference to administrative agencies.
Prior to the decision in Chevron, a court was always free to substitute its construction of a statute for that suggested by an administrative agency. Thus, when an opinion said "deference to an
agency interpretation," it perhaps meant something like "respect
for an agency's expert opinion," but certainly not "abdication of
' 123
authority and responsibility for interpretation."
But the Chevron Court's "deference" is a much stronger concept. If there is no "clear congressional intent" and the agency's
interpretation is "reasonable," then "a court may not substitute its
own construction" for that advanced by the agency. 124 In the
changed interpretative context established by Chevron, deference
means not simply that a court must consider an agency's interpretation, but that it "must give controlling weight to that interpreta1 25
tion" in certain well-defined situations.
If Chevron has changed the meaning of deference, so too has it
changed the meaning of the phrase "congressional intent" as used
in judicial opinions. In the pre-Chevron interpretative context, a
court faced a statute with the responsibility of determining its
"one, permanent, 'correct' meaning.' 26 In doing so, a court could
look to the agency interpretation as a suggestion of what this

"ISee

Starr, 3 Yale J Reg at 296 (cited in note 2). Former Judge Starr argues that,

before Chevron, when an agency's interpretation was consonant with that made by the
Court, it may have been no more than a "happy coincidence." He concludes: "To defer to an
agency's interpretation, then, was merely to give some weight to its interpretation."
Chevron, 467 US at 843-44.
21 Starr, 3 Yale J Reg at 296 (cited in note 2). See also Farina, 89 Colum L Rev at 45663 (cited in note 3). Judge Starr points out that this new definition of deference eliminated
a particularly troublesome ambiguity in Supreme Court jurisprudence:
Not only were there two conflicting lines of cases, but the Court failed to formulate any
consistent rationale explaining why it sometimes used one approach and sometimes the
other. Not surprisingly, this led several commentators to suggest that the deference
standard was being applied in a result-oriented manner, with judges making independent interpretations and then invoking the principle only when it was convenient. Justice Marshall, dissenting from the Court's decision to reject an agency interpretation of
a statute in Industrial Union Department,AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute,
argued that by ignoring precedent calling for judicial deference, the Court had given
credence to the "frequently voiced criticism" that the deference principle is honored
"only when the Court finds itself in substantive agreement with the agency action at
issue."
Starr, 3 Yale J. Reg at 293-94 (cited in note 2) (citations omitted).
"I Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 517 (cited in note 7).
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meaning might be. If it accepted the agency interpretation it would
12 7
be inclined to cite precedent from the "deference" line of cases.
If it chose not to accept the agency interpretation, it could simply
"say what the law is."'12s Therefore, a court might well claim in its
opinion that it was using traditional methods of statutory construction to determine "congressional intent," whether or not it believed that Congress intended only one possible interpretation. Because of this earlier attitude towards the role of the judiciary in
statutory construction, pre-Chevron opinions which claim to base a
statutory construction on so-called "congressional intent" may not
rise to the level of congressional intent needed to satisfy step one
of the Chevron analysis.
Because of the inherent difficulty in matching pre-Chevron
language with post-Chevron requirements, both the reading of
Maislin suggested in Section L.A and the approach used by the
Mesa Verde court are unsatisfactory. "Deference" in pre-Chevron
opinions does not mean "deference" as defined by Chevron. "Congressional intent" in an opinion does not necessarily mean that
level of clarity required by Chevron, but perhaps "mean[s] no
more than that the panel regarded it as the better reading. ' 129
A better approach than those described in Section I would be
to presume that no pre-Chevronjudicial construction of an agencyadministered statute which claims to be based on congressional intent actually meets the Chevron step one test.1 30 Every new agency
127 See Starr, 3 Yale J Reg at 293-94 (cited in note 2).
128 See Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). See Merrill, 101 Yale L J

at 972 (cited in note 9). Professor Merrill points out that the "default rule was one of independent judicial judgment." Even when confronted by an agency interpretation of a statute
it administered, "[d]eference to the agency interpretation was appropriate only if a court
could identify some factor or factors that would supply an affirmative justification for giving
special weight to the agency views."
12 Clinchfield Coal Co. v FederalMine Safety and Health Commission, 895 F2d 773,
777 (DC Cir 1990). See Section II.A.
130 This approach might seem to threaten values imbedded in the doctrine of stare decisis to an unacceptable extent. The Supreme Court has shown a "general reticence to overrule precedents construing statutes," perhaps on the theory that "congressional failure to
enact legislation reversing a judicial decision indicates Congress' approval of the Court's
interpretation of an earlier statute." Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case
for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 Mich L Rev 177, 181, 184 (1989). In this
article, Professor Marshall argues for an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis, which would
require Congress to again become an "active participant in [the] ongoing process of statutory lawmaking." Id at 183, 200-19. By putting Congress on notice that only it can change
statutory constructions made by the judiciary, Congress will be required to address any such
constructions that occasion public displeasure. Id.
Depending on how one views the reach of a policy of strict statutory stare decisis, however, it can be indifferent or inimical to the Chevron principle. On the one hand, if one
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interpretation of a statute would, therefore, require a full Chevron
analysis.
Using this approach, the construction of a statute in an earlier
opinion would have precedential value in only one situation. It
would stand as a valid alternative reading of the statute, requiring
that a subsequent court either accept it under Chevron step one as
the one meaning required by clear congressional intent, or accept it
as a possible reading under Chevron step two. A court could not
find that Congress had spoken directly to the issue at hand and
construe the statute in opposition to the prior interpretation. In
other words, a court could not find that Chevron step one requires
a particular interpretation but arrive at a result different from the
earlier case. To do so would presume that the earlier court 31 had
either mistakenly or deliberately ignored congressional intent in
the earlier decision. 13 Although it is possible that this could happen (courts, after all, do make mistakes), such a presumption
would not be possible under the doctrine of stare decisis. It is not
for lower courts to determine that higher courts erred.""3

simply says that any constructions of agency-administered statutes based on clear congressional intent should be followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, then various arguments
as to how strictly the Court should adhere to its own precedents construing statutes apply
to these precedents as well and do not seem to threaten any values inherent in the Chevron
principle. See William N. Eskridge, InterpretingLegislative Inaction, 87 Mich L Rev 67
(1988), for another view on this issue.
On the other hand, if one says that no statutory construction made by the Court should
be overruled-as long as it has withstood congressional reversal through legislation for a
sufficient period of time-then the Chevron principle would be seriously limited. It can be
argued that this approach was the basis for the Court's decisions in Maislin and Lechmere;
both were longstanding interpretations from which "Congress ha[d] not diverged." Maislin,
497 US at 131. See text accompanying notes 40-42 and 93-102.
However, the question of whether or not to accept this approach is merely a dispute
about the underlying wisdom of Chevron. To maintain that only Congress has the power to
overrule Supreme Court precedents construing statutes, even those precedents that address
issues expressly delegated to administrative agencies by Congress, is to argue that the underlying responsibility for interpreting such statutes should lie with the courts and not with
the administrative agencies. There is not, of course, unanimity on whether Chevron was
"right"; however, if one accepts the Chevron principle, then, at the very least, statutory
stare decisis should be limited to those statutory constructions based on congressional intent. See text accompanying notes 20-27.
131 Which, in this situation, would be a higher court or a prior panel of a circuit court.
232 See text accompanying note 29.
133 Higher courts can overrule lower courts, of course. But if, for instance, the Supreme
Court were considering a pre-Chevron construction of a statute made by a circuit court,
none of the preceding discussion is necessary. The Supreme Court would simply overrule
the prior decision, whether it found that the interpretation was a Chevron step one or step
two.
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Clinchfield Coal and the New Interpretative Context

The D.C. Circuit addressed the question of how to deal with
pre-Chevron precedent in Clinchfield Coal Co. v Federal Mine
Safety and Health Commission.34 In Clinchfield, the D.C. Circuit
considered an appeal from an order of the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Commission directing Clinchfield Coal to pay a week's
salary to workers idled after an explosion in one of its mines. The
Commission closed down the mine under § 107(a) of the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977,1" which authorizes shutdown
of a mine when an "imminent danger" is discovered. The United
Mine Workers filed a claim under § 111 of the Act, which provides
for compensation of up to one week's pay to miners out of work
due to the closure of a mine under a § 107 order issued "for a
failure of the operator
to comply with any mandatory health or
13 6
safety standards.'

Clinchfield contended that the § 111 claim was precluded by7
13
the fact that the § 107 order had not specified a safety violation.
The Commission rejected this position, noting that it had issued
citations to Clinchfield for safety violations that had caused the
explosion-upon completion of the Commission's investigation,
nine months after the mine closure. 8" The court accepted the
Commission's interpretation of § 111 as requiring compensation if
the violations later cited had caused the danger underlying the §
107 order."3 9

However, in an earlier decision, District 6, UMWA v United
States Dept. of Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals,40 the
D.C. Circuit had found that the predecessor provision of § 111,
which had identical language, permitted compensation only if a
shutdown was "actually ordered because of" a type of a mine operator's failure that was covered at that time. Clinchfield contended
that the court could not alter the law of the circuit, and was required to find that Clinchfield was not liable to the idled miners.
The court refused to accept this contention, arguing that in
the new interpretative context created by Chevron the seemingly
clear language of the District 6 court was not controlling prece154

895 F2d 773 (DC Cir 1990).
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dent.14 1 The District 6 court had said, however, that the Commission's earlier interpretation was not "simply a reasonable reading
of an ambiguous statute, but [ ] one 'compell[ed]' by the language
and legislative history. ' 142 The Clinchfield court argued that "[i]n
doing so, however, [the District 6] court relied on a narrower concept of judicial deference than what Chevron now plainly requires. ' 14' The Clinchfield opinion pointed to language used by
Judge Leventhal in his District 6 concurrence which it took to be
the pre-Chevron approach to statutory interpretation: "Questions
of legislative intent require the courts, in the last analysis, to reconstruct how the legislature would have decided the specific issue
if it had been specifically addressed by the legislature. '144 Judge
Leventhal's suggested approach, together with "the panel opinion's
own stated purpose 'to determine which interpretation Congress
intended,'" convinced the Clinchfield court that the District 6
panel's "conclusion that the language and history 'compell[ed]' the
no-compensation result [meant] no more than that the panel re1 45
garded it as the better reading.'
The Clinchfield court held that "[s]uch a finding is not
enough to bind the Commission under Chevron,' 46 and explained
how Chevron had established a new context in which language
used in earlier opinions may not mean what it appears to say:
The concept of review invoked by Judge Leventhal overlooked the possibility that Congress meant no more than to
allow the agency to select among reasonable interpretations.
Chevron presumes this to have been the case unless Congress
has spoken clearly.... Thus, while under District 6 we must
assume that the Commission's former view was the better one,
that decision is not a finding that Congress clearly resolved
the issue, and it leaves the Commission free to choose the
47
other if reasonable.1

Clinchfield, 895 F2d at 777-78.
Id at 777, quoting District 6, 562 F2d at 1266.
142 Clinchfield, 895 F2d at 777. See also National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v Federal
4
142

Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 899 F2d 1244, 1248 (DC Cir 1990) ("But even if [an earlier]
case had directly addressed that question . . . as a pre-Chevron decision, [it] would not
foreclose the Commission from reinterpreting an ambiguity in its organic statute.") (emphasis in original).
144 Clinchfield, 895 F2d at 777, quoting District 6, 562 F2d at 1268 (Leventhal
concurring).
145 Clinchfield, 895 F2d at 777 (citations omitted), quoting District 6, 562 F2d at 1265.
246 Clinchfield, 895 F2d at 777.
''

Id at 777-78 (citations omitted).
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A Presumption of Incommensurability

A better approach to the problem of pre-Chevron authority after Chevron is reflected in the Clinchfield decision: a court would
presume that a prior judicial interpretation of a statute cannot be
binding precedent in the changed interpretative context brought
about by the Chevron decision. When confronted with a new
agency interpretation of a statute previously construed by a higher
court, a court would redo the Chevron two step test. This approach
is better because it frees courts to give effect to the values inherent
in Chevron; courts will not be bound by decisions made by earlier
courts which may not have had the same respect for administrative
agency authority over statutory interpretation that is the hallmark
of Chevron.
Under either the Clinchfield approach advocated in this Comment or the Mesa Verde approach, a judge might look at the previous opinions and determine whether there was clear congressional
intent. Perhaps, the only difference for a judge would come in
framing an opinion to justify his decision. Under the approach suggested by the Clinchfield decision, a judge would discuss whether
clear congressional intent exists. Under the Mesa Verde approach,
a judge would discuss whether the prior opinions revealed that the
courts had found congressional intent satisfactory to meet the
Chevron step one standard.
Under the Mesa Verde approach a court would still have to
present an argument as to what Congress's intent was, but would
have to do so in an oblique discussion about how the earlier court
had successfully discerned that intent. If one accepts the premise
of the Clinchfield court, it is not possible to learn whether or not
an earlier court was holding that Congress had spoken directly to
the issue, since an earlier court was not operating in the context
created by Chevron in which clear congressional intent on the precise question at issue is the only consideration which can overcome
the presumption of deference to reasonable agency interpretations.
However, even if one does not accept the premise of the Clinchfield court, the attempt to substantiate congressional intent behind
a statute by arguing from earlier opinions rather than from the
statute itself is of dubious worth.
Using the Clinchfield approach, as opposed to the Mesa Verde
approach, would require courts to concentrate more closely on arguments about congressional intent, rather than arguments about
judicial intentions as revealed by earlier opinions. This would support Chevron's central purpose: leaving to administrative agencies
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responsibility and authority for the interpretation of statutes
which they administer.
Despite arguments that the Supreme Court has not followed
the Chevron principle consistently when it has considered agency
statutory constructions, 4 8 it continues to be a vital principle in administrative law. Consequently, even if the Lechmere decision continues to define the approach of the Supreme Court to pre-Chevron constructions of statutes, the Clinchfield approach would
provide lower courts with a more consistent way of addressing preChevron authority than attempting to predict which pre-Chevron
interpretations the Supreme Court will find to have been based on
the "clear meaning" of the statute. Considering the lack of evidence supporting Justice Thomas's contention in Lechmere that
Babcock had determined the clear meaning of the statutory provision in question, 149 it is conceivable that any pre-Chevron construction of a statute could be found by the Supreme Court to
have been based on that statute's "clear meaning."' 50 By requiring
itself to find clear congressional intent behind an earlier precedent
'before striking down a new interpretation made by an administrative agency, or to find conclusively that no congressional intent can
be found to support an earlier judicial construction, a circuit court
would assemble strong arguments for its ruling, should the case go
to the Supreme Court. It would also base the decision on the commands of Chevron and thereby require that any attempt to overrule its decision explicitly respond to Chevron arguments. If this
approach were consistently followed in the circuits, it would encourage the Supreme Court to take the values inherent in the
Chevron principle into account when considering earlier constructions of statutes administered by agencies. 1 '

"' "In short, the post-Chevron decisions explicating the meaning of Chevron reveal
much that calls into question the Court's fidelity to the doctrine.... [The] decisions reveal
a pattern of qualifying or compromising the doctrine with other principles suggesting that
Chevron rests at best uneasily in the larger body of administrative law." Merrill, 101 Yale L
J at 990 (cited in note 9).
1' See text accompanying notes 103-08.
150 See text accompanying notes 109-13.

Equally viable responses, of course, would be to expressly limit Chevron in its application to pre-Chevron precedent, or to overrule Chevron. Although the first alternative
might be attractive to the Court, it would open a logical hole in the doctrine. As Professor
Merrill notes: "Indeed, the D.C. Circuit in Chevron had invalidated the EPA's interpretation of 'stationary source' largely because it was contrary to prior D.C. Circuit precedent,
and the Court held that this did not justify a departure from deference." Merrill, 101 Yale L
J at 989 (cited in note 9). The second alternative, overruling Chevron, would probably not
be attractive to the Court.
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CONCLUSION

There is no agreement about what approach to take in considering pre-Chevron interpretations of statutes that have been reinterpreted by administrative agencies. There appears to be a conflict between the doctrine of stare decisis, requiring courts to
uphold earlier judicial constructions of statutes, and the demands
of Chevron, which calls for deference to interpretations made by
administrative agencies, unless Congress has clearly intended that
a particular interpretation should govern.
An approach can be developed by considering one reading of
the Supreme Court's decision in Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v
PrimarySteel, Inc.152 together with the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Mesa Verde Construction Co. v Northern California District
Council of Laborers.153 This approach calls for a judge to read earlier opinions which construed the statute and determine whether
the earlier court believed its interpretation implemented Congress's intent. If so, then the earlier construction would satisfy
Chevron's first step and would be binding precedent. If not, then
the court would consider the earlier interpretation to have been
based on deference, proceed to Chevron's second step, and defer to
any reasonable interpretation offered by the administrative
15 4
agency.
This Comment argues that a better approach, supported by a
different reading of Maislin and the D.C. Circuit's decision in
Clinchfield Coal v Federal Mine Safety and Health Commission,' 55 would regard any pre-Chevron constructions of statutes reinterpreted by the agencies as only informative, rather than as
binding precedent. This approach recognizes that Chevron radically changed the interpretative context, and that pre-Chevron notions of deference and responsibility for statutory construction
make reliance on earlier opinions less useful than the Mesa Verde
court suggested. This approach calls for courts to consider anew
the Chevron question when confronted by any agency reinterpretation of a statute. In doing so, courts hew more closely to the central principle of Chevron: responsibility and authority for interpretation of agency-administered statutes should reside with the
agencies themselves.
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